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Monetary Policy in Tanzania
Accomplishments and the Road Ahead
Pantaleo J. Kessy, Johnson Nyella, and Stephen A. O'Connell
The reserve-money programming framework that has successfully guided 
monetary policy in Tanzania over the past two decades is on the cusp of what 
is arguably its first major change—a transition from monetary aggregates to 
interest rates as the operational target of policy, in the context of taking on 
many of the core elements of inflation targeting. We focus in this chapter on 
the road ahead and the issues the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) will confront as it 
makes this transition. Our focus throughout will be on the conduct of national 
monetary policy, noting that the BoT's direction of travel is fully consistent 
with the convergence process towards East African Monetary Union.
Our central argument is that the BoT is continuing to evolve towards a 
modem system of what Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) called constrained 
discretion, in which monetary policy provides a strong anchor for inflation 
expectations while also performing a role in stabilizing the real economy. We 
will argue that a clearer focus on interest rates can improve the transparency of 
policy and strengthen the BoT's leverage over inflation—and also that it can 
enhance the development of the financial sector, a key secondary objective of 
monetary policy in Tanzania. We begin, however, with the origins of the 
current system and the sources of its success to date.
11.1 The Monetary/Fiscal Accord of the Mid-1990s
The current framework for monetary policy dates from the fiscal and legislative 
reforms of the mid-1990s. By the early 1990s, a decade of market-based reforms 
had restored the role of market prices throughout the economy, including the
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exchange rate and interest rates (Chapter 2, this volume). Exchange controls 
had been eliminated for current account transactions, privatization of the 
banking sector was underway, and the government bond market was being 
developed. A situation of fiscal dominance nonetheless persisted, in which the 
banking system and the central bank were obliged to finance any public-sector 
spending not covered by tax revenues or foreign grants. Domestic financing 
therefore ballooned when the government's commitment to revenue mobil­
ization and expenditure control slackened in the early 1990s and conflict with 
external donors emerged (Mpango, 2002).
The Bank of Tanzania was operating at that time under the 1978 Amend­
ments to the Bank of Tanzania Act, which obliged the Bank to support the 
development priorities of the government (Appendix Table llA.l shows the 
relevant provisions). Market-based reforms and privatization of the banking 
system had allowed the BoT to retreat from the wide range of quasi-fiscal roles 
it had assumed in the long wake of the Amsha Declaration,^ but the BoT 
arguably had neither the mandate nor the political independence in the 
early 1990s to contain inflation in the face of large fiscal deficits. To do so 
would have required holding back overall money growth, which would have 
required a sharp and costly contraction in bank lending to the private sector. 
What was needed to bring down inflation at a tolerable cost to the economy— 
and to open the space for a monetary policy capable of delivering price 
stability on an ongoing basis—^was an accord that would lock in fiscal discip­
line in the near term while placing the BoT at arm's length from future 
demands for excessive monetary finance.
The key elements of the accord that emerged in Tanzania in the mid-1990s 
were an explicit acknowledgment, at the highest levels of government, that 
inflation was being driven by the monetary finance of fiscal deficits; an 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)-supported agreement that directly pre­
vented monetary finance by imposing a monthly cash budget on the spend­
ing ministries; and a new Bank of Tanzania Act (1995) that bolstered the 
institutional independence of the BoT.^
Section 5.3 of the BoT Act of 1995 elevated price stability to unambiguous 
status as the chief objective of monetary policy in Tanzania. The increased 
clarity that this conferred may have made little difference at first to the disin­
flation that got underway in 1995/96; and on paper, the BoT's capability to 
pursue its mandate appeared to be undermined by a passage in the 1995 Act— 
never activated, and eliminated in the Bank of Tanzania Act of 2006—that 
authorized the Minister of Finance to conduct monetary policy unilaterally for 
a period of up to a year in the event of 'irreconcilable disagreement' with the 
Board of the Central Bank (see Appendix Table llA.l). But the cost of that 
disinflation to the aggregate real economy—looking at Figure 11.1—appears to 
have been extremely mild. By comparison with the growth that was taking
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Real GDP growth and inflation in Tanzania
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Grey lines show average growth and median inflation for 114 emerging/developing countries.
Figure 11.1. Inflation and growth in Tanzania, 1984/85-2014/15 
Source: BoT and IMF October 2015 World Economic Outlook database online.
place in other developing countries, Tanzania's cost was centred in 1996/97, 
when growth was unchanged in Tanzania while it rose in other countries, and 
completely absent by 1997/98, when Tanzania's GDP growth rate did fall by a 
small amount, but by less than that in the rest of the developing world.
The buoyancy of Tanzania's real economy in the face of a concerted money- 
based disinflation is at odds with the typical experience in emerging-market 
economies, where stabilizations accomplished through tight monetary policy 
have been associated with a demand-driven recession as high interest rates 
take a toll on aggregate demand (Calvo and Vegh, 1999). Tanzania's milder 
experience may reflect the prevalence of flexible prices in Tanzania's large 
agricultural and urban informal sectors, along with the impact of direct gov­
ernment controls over some influential prices (e.g., for public utilities) and 
wages (e.g., in the public sector)—these factors may have facilitated rapid 
disinflation without requiring a major contraction in aggregate demand. 
Stmctural reforms helped to reduce inflationary pressures from the supply 
side (Chapter 2, this volume), and donor inflows softened the underlying 
fiscal adjustment. But the low aggregate cost of Tanzania's disinflation is also 
consistent with a favourable credibility effect. In this interpretation, partici­
pants in the economy interpreted the multifaceted accord as a durable change 
in the fiscal and monetary policy regime, and adjusted their inflationary
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expectations accordingly. This adjustment in expectations allowed inflation 
to fall without requiring a sharp economic contraction (Sargent, 1982).
11.2 Reserve-Money Programming since 1995
The operational legacy of the mid-90s accord, in terms of BoT practice, was the 
reserve-money-targeting framework that has governed the conduct of monet­
ary policy over the two subsequent decades. The hallmark of this framework is 
a set of monthly ceilings for the growth in reserve money that are derived from 
the inflation and growth targets in the government's annual budget.
Three main considerations favored the choice of reserve-money targeting in 
Tanzania, both during the disinflation episode and after inflation had fallen 
into the 5 per cent range by the late 1990s (Figure 11.1).^ The first was that any 
framework for price stability needs a nominal anchor, and restoring the fixed- 
exchange rate system for this purpose was out of the question. The government 
was committed to a market-determined exchange rate, having laboured over 
much of the previous decade to dismantle the highly distorting exchange- 
control regime that had emerged from the balance-of-payments crises of the 
1970s. So the system would need a different nominal anchor.
Inflation itself had emerged as a possible nominal anchor in the formal 
inflation-targeting (IT) system introduced by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
in 1989. The Reserve Bank's framework combined an explicit numerical 
range for inflation with new standards of communication, transparency, 
and independence in central bank practice. But as of the mid-1990s, IT was 
regarded as an option limited to countries with well-developed financial 
markets and high-quality data, and with established traditions of fiscal dis­
cipline. The main alternative to the exchange rate among developing 
countries—and the natural choice for the BoT—was the path of a broad 
monetary aggregate like M2^
Given a monetary aggregate as nominal anchor, a second decisive feature 
favoring reserve-money targeting was the mdimentary condition of Tanza­
nian financial markets. In a well-developed financial market, a central bank 
can pursue a broad monetary aggregate using either a short-term interest rate 
or some variant of reserve money as its operating target.^ But interbank and 
short-term government bond markets were in their infancy in Tanzania in the 
1990s, and large parts of the mral economy continued to operate mainly on 
currency. The interest-rate option was therefore unrealistic. It is only recently 
that the option of setting a target for a short-term interest rate, and relying on 
financial markets to translate the BoT's target into economy-wide lending 
conditions and the exchange rate and other key asset prices, has become 
potentially viable.
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A final and non-trivial consideration in favour of reserve-money targeting 
grew out of its distinctive role in accomplishing the disinflation. The central 
focus of reforms and IMF conditionality was ending the monetary finance of 
fiscal deficits. The BoT had been providing this finance through its accumula­
tion of government securities, other advances to government, and loans to 
commercial banks that could be on-lent to public entities. A sequence of 
explicit ceilings on the BoT's net domestic assets, implemented with high 
transparency via the cash budget and specified as IMF programme conditions, 
therefore played a key role in the disinflation strategy. In the context of a 
flexible exchange rate and a sequence of separate targets for the BoT's inter­
national reserves (the main component of the BoT's net foreign assets), these 
ceilings implied a target path for the sum of the BoT's net domestic assets and 
net foreign assets—in effect, for the size of the BoT's overall balance sheet. By 
the balance-sheet identity, this in turn meant a target path for the BoT's main 
liability, reserve money. Targets for reserve money therefore played a key role 
during the disinflation episode, simultaneously providing a nominal anchor 
for inflation and supporting an accord that very clearly and publicly distanced 
the BoT from fiscal pressures.
By the late 1990s, the success of the disinflation was clear and the question 
of an appropriate monetary framework could in principle have been posed 
anew. But the conditions emphasized in this section remained relevant, 
including the commitment to exchange-rate flexibility, the thinness of 
domestic financial markets, and the familiarity of the framework within the 
context of an ongoing policy dialogue with the IMF. Added to these was the 
basic suitability of the IMF's financial programming model to the data-poor 
environment of the BoT.® Reserve-money programming was therefore a nat­
ural choice for Tanzania even outside of a stabilization context, as it was 
starting in the 1990s for many low-income countries transitioning away 
from fixed exchange rates and developing the capacity to conduct an inde­
pendent monetary policy (Berg etal., 2015).
Tanzania's system has been remarkably successful, as illustrated in 
Figures 11.2a and 11.2b. The BoT's primary legislative mandate, dating from 
the BoT Act of 1995, is to maintain 'price stability conducive to a balanced and 
sustainable growth of the national economy of Tanzania'.'^ This objective 
reflects the twofold principle that the ultimate aim of monetary policy is to 
provide an environment conducive to favourable performance of the real 
economy, and that the single most important contribution the central bank 
can make to this goal is to achieve price stability, defined in practice as a 
reasonably low and stable rate of inflation.® The BoT's mandate includes the 
cmcial secondary objective, also grounded in the ultimate aim of balanced 
and sustainable growth, of supporting the development and stability of the 
financial sector (see Appendix Table llA.l).
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— Target —Actual
Grey line shows the unweighted average of GDP growth for 138 
emerging/developing countries.
Figure 11.2a. Targeted and actual real GDP growth in Tanzania, 1995/96-2014/15 
Source: BoT and IMF, April 2015 World Economic Outlook database online.
Figures 11.2a and 11.2b compare the performance of gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth and consumer price index (CPI) inflation to the government's 
annual fiscal-year targets for these variables. With the exception of 2008/09— 
the inaugural year of the global financial crisis—the real economy has met or 
out-performed the government's growth targets despite their rapid increase 
from 4 per cent at the outset of the disinflation to roughly 7 per cent per year 
by the late 1990s. By comparison with 138 other developing countries, 
Tanzanian GDP growth has proven remarkably robust to the global shocks 
of the post-2006 period, including the global food price shocks of 2006 and 
2007, the global financial crisis, and the collapse of global commodity prices 
(particularly energy) starting in 2011. Energy prices have a special status 
their recent collapse has helped the Tanzanian economy while simultan­
eously dampening the future prospects of the natural gas sector and serving 
as an early warning of the volatility to which Tanzania will be exposed if it 
becomes a major energy exporter.
The real-side accomplishments in Figure 11.2a provide indirect testimony to 
the success of monetary policy since the mid-1990s—at the very least it has 
apparently done little harm, unless substantially more ambitious growth 
targets were appropriate for the period. A similarly favourable—but somewhat 
more complex—story emerges in Figure 11.2b, which shows CPI inflation. 
Following its rapid decline during the second half of the 1990s, headline
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---- Target Headline inflation — Excl. Food & Energy
Target pertains to headline; see discussion in text.
Grey line shows median CPI inflation rate for 138 emerging/developing countries.
Figure 11.2b. Targeted and actual real CPI inflation in Tanzania, 1995/96-2014/15
Note-. From FY2011/2012 to FY2015/16 the Government’s inflation target has been stated as 'CPI 
inflation in single digits.’ In the Figure we use 9.5% to denote this target. The BoT continues to 
maintain an internal medium-term target of 5%.
Source: BoT and IMF, April 2015 World Economic Outlook database! online.
inflation has remained below 10 per cent in most years and within 5 points of 
the median for 138 developing and emerging-market countries with the 
exception of 2010 and 2011. Core inflation, which excludes food and energy 
prices, has been even lower, remaining below 10 per cent since FY1996/97.® 
Headline inflation has nonetheless remained above the BoT's 'medium-term 
target' of 5 per cent since FY2004/05, and some dissonance has emerged 
between this aspirational goal and the government's annual fiscal-year target, 
which has been stated since 2011 as the less demanding 'inflation in single 
digits'. As of 2014/15, however, inflation was once again under firm control, 
approaching 5 per cent on a headline basis and well below that for core.
11.2.1 Implementing the Framework
Figure 11.3 provides a sense of reserve-money targeting in action. Annual 
targets for the growth in reserve money are derived within the framework 
directly from the government's growth and inflation targets shown in 
Figures 11.2a and 11.2b. To show how, we need a bit of notation: we will use 
P to denote the CPI, y to denote real GDP, M to denote the monetary aggregate
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----- RM growth upper bound —•— CPI inflation target + GDP Growth target
Dotted lines; RM growth targets for 1997/98 and 2015/16 are from Monetary Policy Statements. 
All other RM growth rates are calculated using end-yr targets and end-previous-yr actual levels.
Figure 11.3. Fiscal-year reserve-money growth targets in Tanzania 
Source: Bank of Tanzania.
that serves as the BoT's intermediate target (M2 or M3), and H to denote 
reserve money, defined as the sum of currency in circulation and the 
deposits of commercial banks at the BoT. The links between the targets are 
then defined by two key empirical relationships within the monetary block of 
the IMF's financial programming model. These are M • v = P • y, where v is the 
velocity of the BoT's intermediate target; and M = ju. • H, where p. is the money 
multiplier. Taken together, these relationships imply P • y = v • p • ff or, using 
the notation ^(-) to denote a growth rate from one year to the next,
rT+g^g{H) + \g{v)+g{,j.)], (11.1)
where we have used n = g{P) to denote the CPI inflation rate and g = g{y) to 
denote the growth rate of real GDP.
Equation (11.1) provides a consistency framework that relates the growth rate 
of reserve money to the growth rates of nominal income, velocity, and the 
money multiplier. The fiscal-year budget adopted by Parliament includes the 
inflation and real GDP growth targets for the year, which tie down ir + g. The BoT 
then forecasts the growth rates of velocity and the money multiplier using a 
combination of econometric modeling and expert judgement. This leaves g{H) as 
the growth rate of reserve money that is consistent with the government's targets.
Holding the growth rates of velocity and the money multiplier constant 
at their forecasted values—more on this in Sections 11.2.2 and 11.3.1—the
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Fiscal year (beginning July of indicated calendar year)
------ RM --------Nominal income • Velocity ------- Multiplier
Figure 11.4. Relation of reserve money growth to nominal income growth 
Source: Bank of Tanzania.
reserve-money-targeting (RMT) framework incorporates a simple account 
of what monetary economists call the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy, defined as the link between the operational targets directly under the 
central bank's control and the ultimate economic outcomes the central bank 
is seeking to influence. For given values of g{v) and g{fc), faster growth in 
reserve money drives the growth of nominal income above the government's 
implied target, with the split between higher n and higher^ determined by the 
slope of the economy's short-run aggregate supply curve. To anchor inflation 
at the targeted level, therefore, the growth of reserve money should not exceed 
the value in equation (11.1).
Figure 11.3 plots the BoT's fiscal-year target for reserve-money growth 
against the government's target for nominal income growth. Given the rela­
tive stability of targeted nominal income growth, the wide amplitude of 
fluctuations in programmed reserve-money growth was driven by large and 
variable trends in velocity and the money multiplier (Adam and Kessy, 2011; 
Adam et al., 2012). While the BoT was reasonably successful at extrapolating 
ongoing trends over this period—Figure 11.4 shows the actual evolution of 
the components of equation (11.1)—some portion of the large cumulative 
decrease in velocity starting in the late 1990s was unanticipated, and led 
to a combination of programme overshoots (see Figure 11.5) and interest- 
rate volatility.
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11.2.2 Evidence of Flexibility in the Application of Reserve-Money Targeting
We emphasized in the previous subsection the hroad success of the reserve- 
money-targeting framework—first, at achieving disinflation, and subse­
quently at providing an anchor for inflation expectations that was consistent 
with rapid and stable growth of the real economy. Some portion of the latter 
success may be due to an ongoing policy dialogue with the IMF that allowed 
greater flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy than the rigid sequence of 
target-setting exercises and programme reviews would appear to have allowed. 
Table 11.1 provides some direct evidence on this point. We consider the 
dynamic relationship between the monthly reserve-money ceilings that 
were derived from semi-annual programme targets and the monthly actual 
performance of reserve money. For each of the two variables—the logs of 
target and actual reserve money—we estimate an error-correction model that 
shows how the variable responded to the previous month's gap between 
reserve money and the target. We include lags of both variables to control 
for other features of the dynamics, and we estimate two versions of the model, 
one in which the gap is simply defined by the difference between the logs of 
reserve money and the target, and one in which we define an adjusted gap that 
has a mean of zero over the full sample but has separate nonzero means before 
and after July 2007.^°
Two suggestive findings stand out from this exercise. First, it is clear that 
the framework operated to constrain monetary policy, as it was intended to 
do. Gaps between reserve money and the ceiling generated policy adjustments 
that altered reserve-money growth in a direction that would reduce the gap. 
This is apparent in the negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
the gap in columns 1 and 5. These adjustments are consistent with an inter­
pretation of the gap as a slippage in policy that required—and produced—a 
corrective adjustment in policy.
Second, however, the targets themselves also appear to have responded to the 
lagged gap. This is not apparent in columns 2 and 6 where the gap enters 
symmetrically, but Granger causality runs in both directions between these 
variables, and when we allow for asymmetric responses—allowing targets to 
adjust differently depending on whether reserve money is above or below the 
ceiling—we find that adjustments in the target did play a systematic role in 
responding to observed gaps (columns 4 and 8).^^ Strikingly, these adjustments 
took place when the gap was positive. Their impact was therefore to partially 
accommodate the 'excessive' reserve money growth that had taken place.^^
This evidence of accommodation has at least two possible interpretations, 
with different implications for the ability of the system to anchor inflation 
expectations. The first is that deviations from target were interpreted with 
some regularity as appropriate responses by the BoT to new information about
250
Table 11.1. Responses to deviations from the reserve-money ceiling
Variable Regressions with unadjusted gap Regressions with adjusted gap
log(RM) log(Ceiling) Log(RM) Log(Ceiling) log(RM) log(Ceiling) Log(RM) Log(Ceiling)
Cap(t-1) -0.301*** 0.053 -0.489*** 0.081
-3.53 0.84 -4.67 1.03
p=0.001 p=0.401 p=0.00 p=0.31
Gap > 0 (t-1) -0.134 0.234** -0.353** 0.298**
-1.01 2.40 -2.16 2.44
p=0.316 p=0.018 p=0.03 p=0.02
Cap < 0 (t-1) -0.514*** -0.179 -0.607*** -0.108
-3.28 -1.56 -4.00 -0.95
p=0.001 p=0.120 p=0.00 p=0.34
Month=Jul 07 -0.025 -0.018 -0.027 -0.021
-0.68 -0.65 -0.73 -0.76
p=0.497 p=0.519 p=0.468 p=0.451
Lags 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
N 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
r2_a 0.251 0.193 0.258 0.215 0.285 0.192 0.285 0.212
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. t values are below the coefficient estimates.
The unadjusted gap is the difference between the log of reserve money and the log of the reserve-money ceiling. The adjusted gap is the residual from a regression of the unadjusted gap on a 
constant and a dummy variable that equals 1 starting in July 2007 and zero otherwise. Monthly data are from the Bank of Tanzania.
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the state of the economy—in other words, as appropriate monetary policy 
decisions that should not be reversed in the absence of even newer informa­
tion. For example, reserve money growth might have exceeded targets because 
the BoT observed that money demand was rising faster, and therefore velocity 
falling faster, than was predicted when the targets for reserve-money growth 
were set. Allowing reserve money to exceed the targets was perfectly appro­
priate in such a situation, and would have been non-inflationary; in fact, a 
policy of forcing reserve-money growth back to pre-existing programme tar­
gets would have created an unnecessary contraction in credit conditions and 
the real economy.
The other interpretation is that the system was unwilling to absorb the 
political costs of correcting episodes of over-expansionary policy, and was 
therefore subject to a degree of inflation bias despite the presence of the IMF 
as an external monitor. Headline inflation does appear to be less well 
anchored after 2005 than before (Figure 11.5 shows the gap between headline 
inflation and the BoT's own medium-term target of 5 per cent). But some 
portion of this is driven by adverse supply shocks originating in Tanzania's 
large food-production sector and world energy markets. Figure 11.2b shows 
core inflation, which excludes food and energy prices and is often viewed as a 
more accurate proxy for expected inflation than headline inflation. Core 
inflation remains below headline over most of the period since 2005. This is
Figure 11.5. Reserve-money targeting in Tanzania 
Source: Bank of Tanzania.
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consistent with a policy that allowed headline inflation to reflect the first- 
round effects of supply shocks, while seeking to limit the transmission of these 
shocks into expectations and core inflation.^'* Figure 11.5 also shows the BoT's 
tendency to mn reserve-money growth below targets after 2007, suggesting a 
real-time response to inflation developments that suggested faster-than- 
anticipated growth in velocity (equation (11.1)). Our own interpretation of 
Table 11.1 therefore leans more heavily on the first explanation—the argu­
ment that reserve-money targeting, as actually practiced in Tanzania, reflected 
a collaborative dialogue with the IMF that allowed an otherwise relatively rigid 
framework to achieve some desirable degree of flexibility in practice. Elements 
of both explanations may of course be present.
11.3 Practical Challenges: Portfolio Shocks, Policy 
Transmission, and Financial Development
Bemanke and Mishkin (1997) use the term constrained discretion to describe a 
monetary policy that provides a strong anchor for inflation while also acting 
to stabilize the real economy. To anchor inflation successfully, the monetary 
authority must be genuinely constrained by its price stability mandate, in the 
sense of being willing to take corrective policy action to bring inflation into 
line even when doing so is costly. Its commitment to doing so must be 
communicated to the public and demonstrated in action, because actual 
inflation depends on expectations of inflation. But if inflation expectations 
are anchored in this sense, then the monetary authority also has scope to 
improve the performance of the real economy by counteracting costly fluctu­
ations in aggregate demand over the business cycle.
We have argued that the success of RMT in Tanzania reflects elements of 
both constraint and discretion. Despite its success, however, RMT has three 
emerging limitations at this stage in Tanzania's development. The first is its 
vulnerability to shocks to velocity and the money multiplier. This vulnerabil­
ity is a familiar property of systems that target monetary aggregates, and when 
other considerations favour a flexible exchange rate as in Tanzania, it is 
generally thought to favour a policy rate system, where inflation serves as the 
intermediate target and a short-term interest rate serves as the operational 
target. Much of modem monetary economics is built around the analysis of 
such systems. The second limitation of RMT is its relative lack of transparency, 
a potentially serious weakness when monetary policy is largely about the 
management of private-sector expectations.
The third limitation of RMT is more speculative, and relates to the two-way 
relationship between the BoT's policy framework and financial development 
in Tanzania. We will argue that even in the absence of fiscal dominance.
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monetary policy in low-income countries may be subject to a subtle but 
challenging trap, where in the short run poorly-developed financial markets 
favor a policy framework that relies for its effectiveness on quantity targets 
and direct interventions—but where these interventions then create a barrier 
to the long-run development of a financial sector that is competitive and 
inclusive enough to support strong transmission of the central bank's policy 
rate throughout the economy.
A policy rate system has advantages in dealing with each of these chal­
lenges. Other combinations of operational and intermediate targets are 
possible—for example, targeting inflation but using reserve money as the 
operating target (as the Bank of Mexico has done for extended periods) or 
targeting broad money but using a short-term interest rate as the operating 
target (as the US Fed did during episodes in the 1970s). And Tanzania's RMT 
framework is itself under constant internal review to improve its operating 
characteristics.^^ In our view, however, the appropriate direction of travel is 
clear: towards a policy rate system in which the role of monetary aggregates is 
de-emphasized and a short-term interest rate is used to target inflation and 
communicate the stance of policy.
11.3.1 Accommodating Portfolio Shocks
The most obvious shortcoming of RMT is its tendency to produce interest-rate 
volatility in the presence of unforeseen shocks to velocity or the money multi­
plier. Figure 11.6 illustrates this point analytically, focusing on the interbank 
market for liquidity in the form of deposits at the BoT.^® The Figure illustrates 
the market for overnight interbank loans, where banks that are short of liquidity 
can borrow at the interbank call money rate Ubcm from banks with liquidity 
to spare.The downward-sloping line in Figure 11.6 shows the net demand for liquid­
ity by all banks taken together. The position of this curve reflects all of the 
determinants of bank demand, including the public's preference for currency 
versus demand deposits, the stringency of legal reserve requirements, and the 
eagerness of banks to lend. But it also depends on the overall supply of 
commercial bank deposits at the BoT. The BoT directly controls this supply 
by purchasing securities or foreign exchange from the banks when it wants to 
expand reserve money and selling securities or foreign exchange when it 
wants to contract reserve money. Net purchases inject liquidity, shifting the 
curve to the left; net sales withdraw liquidity, shifting it to the right. Because 
the interbank market clears at a net inter-bank trade of zero, the resulting 
interbank interest rate is given by the intersection of the demand curve with 
the vertical axis. Net injections reduce the interbank rate, other things equal, 
while net withdrawals (often referred to as 'mopping up') increase it.
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'IBCM
Figure 11.6. An interbank market with and without standing facilities
Note: Given the position of the demand curve for liquidity, the equilibrium is at i in a system 
without standing facilities and at point 1 when standing facilities are in operation.
What this implies is that a system that prioritizes a sequence of reserve- 
money targets must accept the resulting path of short-term interest rates. This 
may in fact be one of the main virtues of reserve-money targeting in a 
situation where the monetary authority wants to adopt a very tight stance— 
for example, in a disinflation where the key objective is to achieve a shift in 
inflation expectations. The quantity target provides the central bank with 
political cover for a policy that will create very high interest rates, with 
attendant costs to borrowers and potentially severe impacts on aggregate 
demand. But when expectations are reasonably anchored, a system that forces 
overall bank liquidity onto a predetermined path can create damaging vola­
tility in short-term interest rates. This volatility emerges when shifts in port­
folio preferences or bank behaviour create unanticipated movements in the 
net demand for liquidity by banks (in equation (11.1), these shifts produce 
forecast errors in the growth rates of velocity and/or the money multiplier). 
The key feature of RMT is that does not accommodate such shifts until after 
the fact, and possibly after an extended period of debate and inaction during 
which the stance of monetary policy is unintendedly loose or tight.
A policy-rate system, by contrast—one in which the BoT determines (and 
communicates) the stance of monetary policy as a target level of some key 
short-term interest rate—automatically accommodates shocks to velocity and 
the money multiplier. Figure 11.6 illustrates the role of open-market oper­
ations and the potential role of standing facilities in such a system. To keep
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the interbank rate near the poliq^ rate ip, the BoT would have to forecast the 
total demand for interbank liquidity at this rate, and use open-market oper­
ations to nudge that demand close to zero. In Figure 11.6 this would require a 
net injection of liquidity, to shift the demand curve to the left and bring the 
interbank rate down towards the target. These operations could be comple­
mented by the use of standing facilities—a deposit facility that allowed banks 
to deposit any amount at the BoT, and receive an interest rate below the policy 
rate, and a borrowing facility that allowed banks to borrow overnight from the 
BoT, at a rate above the policy rate. If conditions in the interbank market were 
as shown in Figure 11.6 (net of the BoT's open-market operations),^® the 
interbank market would clear at a rate very close to with banks satisfying 
their excess demand at the standing borrowing facility.
In the process of steering short-term interest rates, the BoT would lose 
control over the supply of bank reserves, which would respond endogenously 
to the demand for reserves via the BoT's open-market operations and any 
transactions at the standing facilities. Monetary aggregates could of course 
serve as information variables, with unusual behaviour of reserve money or 
broader aggregates leading to possible revisions in the policy rate.
11.3.2 Improving Transparency
Because wage- and price-setting is a forward-looking process, the management 
of inflation expectations is a central task of monetary policy (Woodford, 
2003). The disadvantages of monetary aggregates from this perspective have 
become clearer as central banks have increased their focus on price stability 
and placed greater emphasis on communication with the public. By contrast 
with a broad monetary aggregate, inflation is a widely understood concept 
that is readily observable as an intermediate target and (by definition) directly 
related to the objective of price stability. A similar point applies to the choice 
of operational target. Few people understand and follow reserve money, and 
despite the simplicity of equation (11.1) the empirical links between reserve 
money and inflation are complex. Short-term interest rates, by contrast, are 
easily observed and interpreted, and their relevance to the private spending 
decisions of firms and households are widely understood.
11.3.3 Strengthening Policy Transmission and Fostering 
Financial Development
In well-developed financial markets, the impact of interest-rate volatility oper­
ates through aggregate demand, as in the classic analysis by Poole (1970). But 
when financial markets are less developed, a set of new considerations become 
important. First, the transmission of short-term interest rates into longer-term
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rates and aggregate demand tends to be weak (Mishra et al., 2014), suggesting 
that conventional concerns about the demand-side effects of interest-rate 
volatility may be overstated. Second and by the same token, the absence of a 
reliable transmission mechanism from monetary policy to aggregate demand 
may appear to limit the scope for virtually any discretionary demand manage­
ment by the central bank—while in reality its main impact may be to encour­
age the continued use of direct, quantity-based interventions that impose 
high costs on the banking system. Finally, the impact of interest rate volatility 
and direct interventions on banking-sector development gives rise to a link 
between the monetary framework and long-run growth that is largely absent 
in advanced economies.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that the RMT framework may be 
less well adapted to an environment of rapid financial-sector innovation and 
economic transformation than it has been to the conquest of fiscal dominance 
and the establishment of a credible monetary-policy anchor for inflation.
The common thread in these concerns is apparent in Figure 11.7—which 
shows the high volatility of short-term interest rates in Tanzania and their 
limited pass-through into bank deposit and lending rates^^—and Figure 11.8, 
which uses a rough measure of pass-through to compare Tanzania with other 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Figure 11.8 shows the year-by-year 
ratios of the standard deviation of monthly bank loan rates to the standard 
deviation of monthly short-term T-bill rates. Higher values of this index are
Figure 11.7. Interest rates and monetary transmission in Tanzania 
Source: Bank of Tanzania.
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Figure 11.8. Volatility of monthly interest rates: Tanzania vs. nine other SSA
Note: this figure includes all countries with in SSA with available data (Cape Verde, Kenya, Malawi, 
Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia), except the CFA coun­
tries and non-South African members of the Rand Monetary Area.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics online.
associated with stronger pass-through of short-term to long-term interest 
rates. Tanzania's ratio is consistently below the median for twelve comparator 
countries with available data, and far below the average for these countries.^”
The weak pass-through in Figures 11.7 and 11.8 is consistent with broader 
difficulties empirical researchers have encountered in uncovering evidence of 
strong and systematic transmission from monetary policy actions to desired 
impacts on the Tanzanian economy (Davoodi etal., 2013; Montiel etal., 
2012). In substantial part, these difficulties reflect the limitations of conven­
tional methods in a data-poor environment subject to ongoing financial 
innovation and frequent supply shocks (Li et al., 2016). But even by compari­
son with Kenya and Uganda, where policy makers have operated within 
broadly similar RMT-style frameworks, evidence of conventional transmission 
from short-term interest rates to inflation and GDP growth appears to be more 
difficult to detect in Tanzania using standard macroeconomic models and 
econometric approaches (Goncalves, 2015).
Figure 11.7 suggests that despite the challenges of discovering the transmis­
sion mechanism from the data, the BoT can exert a powerful influence on 
economic conditions when it implements a clear change in its policy stance. 
Drawing on Berg etal. (2013), the figure shows the impact of the concerted 
monetary tightening by the central banks of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in 
October of 2011. Short-mn rates rise sharply in Tanzania, and there is a modest
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but perceptible pass-through to deposit rates. Lending rates hardly hudge, 
consistent with the apparent absence of conventional transmission through 
the term stmcture of interest rates. But consistent with bank-level evidence in 
Tanzania (Mbowe, 2012), lending volumes respond strongly to the tightening. 
Berg et al. (2013) also document a tum-around in exchange-rate depreciation— 
the main focus of the intervention—and inflation, the reversal of which is 
evident in Figure 11.5 in this chapter.
Monetary policy can therefore exert strong leverage over inflation in Tanzania, 
and the BoT's willingness to do so when necessary has helped to establish an 
effective monetary-policy anchor for private-sector expectations—an out­
come made possible by the relative absence of fiscal dominance since the 
mid-1990s, but by no means guaranteed. Financial-sector development—a 
key secondary objective of the BoT—has proceeded rapidly in key respects, 
including declines in interest-rate spreads and increases in the ratio of claims 
on the private sector to overall deposits (Figure 11.9).^^ But the policy envir­
onment remains one of high interest-rate volatility, limited transparency, and 
occasional recourse—^particular at moments of clear policy action—to direct 
interventions. The behaviour of banks will of course reflect the environment
CPS = Credit to the Private Sector from deposit money banks.
Figure 11.9. Financial deepening: Tanzania vs. Other SSA
Note: this figure excludes the CFA countries and non-South African members of the Rand Monetary 
Area, but includes all other countries in SSA with available data (Angola, Botswana, Bumndi, Cabo 
Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozam­
bique, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, 
and Zambia).
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics online.
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within which they operate, including any systematic features of the BoT's 
policy framework. If volatile overnight rates are a consequence of RMT, bank 
behaviour will adjust to this volatility. Large excess reserves, for example, have 
been a feature of Tanzania’s banking sector throughout the RMT era, and have 
been associated in cross-country work with a weakening of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy (Saxegaard, 2006). These reserves may in part 
reflect self-protection against episodes of very high interbank rates. Volatility 
of short-term rates can also weaken the transmission of short-term interest 
rates into the longer-term rates that matter more directly for lending and 
aggregate demand (Woodford, 2003).
We emphasized in Section 11.2 that one of the continuing rationales for 
RMT has been the rudimentary nature of the financial sector. Figure 11.9 
suggests that after an initial decade of very rapid expansion in the wake of 
banking-sector privatization and the mid-1990s accord, the pace of financial 
deepening has slowed considerably over the past decade in Tanzania, relative 
to that among comparator countries in SSA. In our view, this constitutes a 
final—and admittedly speculative—argument in favour of transition towards 
a policy-rate system. Particularly in an environment of ongoing financial- 
sector innovation and rapidly increasing financial inclusion, a system that 
stabilizes interest rates is likely to provide stronger encouragement for devel­
opment of the banking sector, while simultaneously preserving and even 
strengthening the BoT's ability to conduct discretionary policy.
11.4 Emerging Issues in Tanzanian Monetary Policy
We close by briefly addressing a set of emerging issues that will shape both the 
BoT's policy framework and the conduct of policy within that framework. We 
focus in turn on achieving East African Monetary Union (EAMU) convergence, 
retaining policy independence, and accommodating the natural gas sector.
11.4.1 Achieving EAMU Convergence
The convergence process towards East African Monetary Union—^with full 
convergence by 2023 at the earliest—both confirms and accelerates the direc­
tion of travel laid out in this chapter. In contrast to the Eurozone, East Africa's 
convergence process is unlikely to involve exchange-rate commitments 
except perhaps over a final period of a few months before union, when 
members may elect to adopt a fixed grid of internal rates. A union-wide central 
bank, in turn, is virtually certain to reflect the practices of its largest members 
by adopting a version of inflation targeting and operationalizing it using 
a policy rate system. The developments discussed so far therefore place
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Tanzania's framework on a course of convergence towards the eventual 
union-wide framework.
In the meantime, an EAMU-driven process of financial-sector harmoniza­
tion is already altering the BoT's operating environment by shaping the set of 
relevant policy instmments and altering the BoT's exposure to portfolio 
shocks. The harmonization of reserve requirements, for example, narrows 
the set of policy instmments by limiting the BoT's recourse to (already very 
intermittent) changes in reserve requirements—appropriately, as we argued 
earlier. The opening of Tanzania's capital account is likely to increase the 
mobility of short-term capital, a development that will heighten the disad­
vantages of RMT by transmitting interest-rate volatility more strongly into 
exchange rates. These considerations add further impetus to Tanzania's shift 
towards a policy rate system.
11.4.2 Retaining Policy Independence
We have emphasized the cmcial importance of the mid-1990s accord in 
overcoming fiscal dominance and thereby allowing the establishment of a 
monetary-policy anchor for inflation. Two concerns will have to be navigated 
if the BoT is to retain the appropriate degree of independence from the fiscal 
authorities. One is that a policy-rate system forces the monetary authority to 
take transparent responsibility for the level of short-term interest rates. Even 
in the absence of direct pressures for monetary finance, a period of fiscal 
indiscipline can put the central bank into the difficult political position of 
having to set a very high policy rate in order to avoid inflationary finance of 
the deficit. To be able to do so effectively requires a political consensus that 
supports the continued pursuit of an inflation target—and places the burden 
of adjustment on the fiscal authorities—even when high interest rates are 
doing clear short-term damage to both private and public borrowers.
The fundamental point is that debt sustainability is a fiscal responsibility. 
Monetary policy cannot be expected to keep interest rates low in real terms, 
and attempting to do so when the fiscal accounts are out of control leads to 
the loss of the inflation anchor. Even formal commitments to inflation tar­
geting are no rescue in such a situation, as illustrated forcefully by Ghana's 
experience since 2011. Such commitments must be backed by a fiscal policy 
that can be sustained without excessive monetary finance. Retaining policy 
independence therefore requires continued recognition that the fiscal/mon­
etary accord achieved in the mid-1990s was crucial to the two subsequent 
decades of macroeconomic stability.
The second concern is more subtle and relates to the BoT's capacity to 
handle the budgetary costs of managing monetary policy. Central banks 
have a monopoly on the currency issue, and more broadly on the issuance
261
Pantaleo J. Kessy et al.
of reserve money. The BoT must absorb the costs of producing currency, but 
neither currency nor (at present) bank reserves pay interest. The BoT is there­
fore typically in the position of earning net profits, because the interest on its 
assets—foreign-exchange reserves, and government securities—is more than 
enough to cover salaries and other operating costs. These profits are trans­
ferred to the government's budget after due provision for maintaining the 
BoT's capital and other financial buffers.
Central banks cannot go bankrupt, but profits can become negative when 
balance-sheet trends sharply reduce net interest earnings. In such a situation, 
the BoT's financial health may become the subject of public concerns, and the 
BoT itself may be subject to scrutiny regarding its financial management. 
Despite the explicit provision for recapitalization in the BoT Act of 2006, the 
danger is that concerns about profitability will exert an undue influence on 
the BoT's monetary policy stance. A looming example relates to the BoT's 
agreements under EAMU and the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC), which require convergence to much higher levels of gross official 
reserves—4.5 months of imports in the case of EAMU and 6 months of 
imports for SADC. Reconciling a substantial build-up of foreign-exchange 
reserves with low inflation is likely to require a shift in the composition of 
the BoT's balance sheet, with the additional reserves financed through costly 
domestic liabilities rather than reserve money. The resulting budgetary pres­
sures call for a well-defined framework of liquidity-management cost sharing 
with the government.
11.4.3 Accommodating the Natural Gas Sector
Tanzania may soon be receiving large foreign direct investment inflows to 
support the development of offshore deep-water natural gas. The projects 
under consideration involve both upstream (extraction) and downstream 
(pipeline and processing and liquefaction) components, and will generate 
well over twenty-five years of natural gas production for domestic consump­
tion and exports. Government revenues will increase substantially once 
exports are underway, in the form of income taxes, royalties, production­
sharing, and government equity participation (see Chapters, this volume). 
Changes in world energy prices will generate volatility in export revenues, 
with implications for foreign exchange markets both directly and via potential 
linkages to foreign creditworthiness and capital flows.
The main macroeconomic issues associated with the gas economy are fiscal 
rather than monetary: the Government must convert a large and persistent 
increase in its spending power into a sustainable increase in the well-being of 
the private sector. The most important responsibility of monetary policy is in 
fact to be clear that it is fiscal policy that matters most of all. This includes
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underscoring the need for sustainable debt accumulation and emphasizing 
the dangers of a pro-cyclical spending response to fluctuations in natural gas 
prices. As a centre of high-quality economic research, the central bank is in a 
unique position to contribute to debates on best practices and to monitor the 
implications of ongoing fiscal management.
Two monetary policy issues, however, will occupy the BoT as the gas 
economy expands. The first is responding (or not) to the wealth effect of 
the resource discovery. Even in the face of a prudent public spending 
response, a substantial increase in the economy's net external wealth means 
higher sustainable consumption spending. This is likely to produce a modest 
and long-lasting real appreciation relative to what would have occurred 
without the resource discovery. Attempts to peg the real exchange rate at its 
pre-discovery level are unlikely to be successful; a policy of resisting nominal 
appreciation, for example, would tend to generate either domestic inflation 
or—holding fast to inflation targets—a contractionary bias in monetary policy 
(Calvo, Reinhart, and Vegh, 1995).
To the degree that spending is front-loaded and has a high domestic com­
ponent, the short-run appreciation that would occur under a passive exchange 
rate policy during the development and early production phases is likely to be 
considerably larger than the real appreciation that is ultimately required to 
absorb the economy's increased spending power. Managing this potential 
overshooting requires an empirical assessment of the appropriate long-run 
appreciation—as a benchmark—and a judgement regarding the costs of a large 
and ultimately temporary real appreciation relative to this benchmark.
The major challenges for monetary policy, however, will emerge once 
exports are underway, and have to do with managing the volatility in global 
energy prices. The macroeconomic management of commodity-price volatil­
ity has been the subject of a voluminous literature—see Frankel (2012) and 
IMF (2012). For a given ex ante exposure to shocks, a distinction can be made 
between policies that improve risk-sharing with external partners (e.g., 
denomination of debt contracts in gas), fiscal rules designed to smooth spend­
ing and ensure debt sustainability in the face of shocks, and monetary policy 
mles that target an appropriate balance of volatility in inflation and real 
GDP. We focus here on the response of monetary policy to volatility in export 
revenues.
The literature on managing external shocks has focused largely on the 
merits of alternative degrees of exchange rate flexibility. A time-honoured 
result states that when domestic prices are sticky, floating exchange rates 
allow for efficient macroeconomic adjustment to shocks that call for a change 
in the real exchange rate. An example is a shock to commodity export prices: a 
favourable shock increases the spending power of a commodity-exporting 
economy, and calls for a real appreciation to induce the appropriate
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production shift towards non-traded goods. A floating nominal exchange rate 
accomplishes this more quickly and at lower macroeconomic cost than a peg.
Inflation-targeting frameworks tend to incorporate a substantial degree of 
exchange-rate flexibility, because the nominal anchor in the system is infla­
tion rather than the exchange rate. The appropriate measure of inflation may 
differ, however, for a country subject to large swings in export prices. The 
reason is that an inflation-targeting central bank will tend to react indirectly— 
and possibly inappropriately—to commodity prices, via their impact on the 
nominal exchange rate. Thus a boom in export prices generates nominal 
appreciation, which tends (other things equal) to reduce inflation. A strict 
inflation targeter pushes back, by lowering interest rates in order to expand 
aggregate demand. But the boom has already expanded aggregate demand, to 
a degree that combines the fiscal response with any increase in the commodity 
sector's demand for domestically produced inputs. If spending on domestic 
output is already procyclical with the export price, a procyclical monetary 
easing may create excessive volatility in the real economy (Lama and Medina, 
2012; Ferrero and Seneca, 2015). A good fiscal rule can soften this conflict very 
considerably, by generating a more neutral spending response. But an 
inflation-targeting rule that uses domestic price inflation rather than the CPI 
inflation may also have a favourable impact, by down-weighting the nomi­
nal exchange rate and avoiding excessive real-side volatility in the face of 
commodity price fluctuations.
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Appendix
Table 11 A.1. Aspects of the legislative mandate of the Bank of Tanzania
Bank of Objectives of Monetary Policy Provisions on Non-Financial
Tanzania Act Relationship to Fiscal Authorities
1965 5.-(1) The principal functions of the Bank 
shall be to exercise the functions of a 
central bank, and, without prejudice to 
the generality of the foregoing, to issue 
currency, to regulate banking and credit, 
to manage the gold and foreign exchange 
reserves of Tanzania, and to perform any 
function conferred upon it (or to act as the 
agent of the Government in respect of any 
function conferred on the Government) 
by or under any international agreement 
to which Tanzania is a party.
5.-(2) Within the context of the economic 
policy of the Government, the activities of 
the Bank shall be directed to the 
promotion of credit and exchange 
conditions conducive to the rapid growth 
of the national economy of Tanzania, due 
regard being had to the desirability of 
fostering monetary stability.
61 .-(1) The Bank may advise the 
Government on any matter 
relating to its functions, powers 
and duties under this or any other 
law and shall advise the 
Government when, in the Bank's 
opinion, any such matter is likely 
to affect the achievement of the 
principal objectives of the Bank as 
set forth in section 5.
61 .-(2) The Government may 
require the Bank to give its advice 
on any matter relating to the 
functions, powers and duties of 
the Bank and credit conditions in 
Tanzania or any proposals, 
measures or transactions relating 
thereto, and the Bank shall give its 
advice accordingly.
1978 S.-(2) [... ] due regard being had to the
Amendment desirability of fostering domestic and 
external monetary stability.
5.-(3) Subject to sections (1) and (2) of this 
document, the Bank shall engage in the 
promotion of rural development, 
industrial and agricultural production and 
the development of such other sectors of 
the economy of Tanzania as the Bank may 
deem appropriate. The Bank shall carry 
out its functions under this subsection 
through, amongst other ways—
(a) the provision of financial facilities, under 
such terms and conditions as the Bank 
may determine, to banks and designated 
financial institutions engaged in the 
financing of the economic sectors referred 
to in this subsection;
(b) the guaranteeing, through funds created 
under Section 46B, of loans, investments 
or advances made available by banks and 
other designated financial institutions 
engaged in the financing of the economic 
sectors referred to in this subsection;
(c) the provision of training facilities or 
opportunities designed to promote the 
development of a system of sound 
financial management in Tanzania;
(continued)
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Table 11A.1. Continued
Bank of 
Tanzania Act
Objectives of Monetary Policy Provisions on Non-Financial
Relationship to Fiscal Authorities
1995
(d) the supervision and inspection of the 
activities of banks and specified financial 
institutions.
5.-(1) The principal functions of the Bank 7.-(1) There shall be regularly held 
shall be to exercise the functions of a consultations between the
central bank and, without prejudice to the Governments and the Governor 
generality of the foregoing, to formulate, on monetary policy,
implement and be responsible for 7.-(2) In the event of fundamental
monetary policy, to issue currency, to and irreconcilable differences
regulate and supervise banks and financial between the Minister and the 
institutions and to manage gold and Governor over monetary policy,
foreign exchange reserves of Tanzania. the Minister shall by Order
5.-(2) The Bank shall promote sound published in the Gazette direct the
monetary, credit and banking conditions Governor to formulate and
conducive to the development of the implement monetary policy along
economy of Tanzania. the position of the Minister for a
5.-(3) The primary objective of the Bank period not exceeding twelve
shall be to formulate and implement months or any other period as
monetary policy directed to the economic shall be specified in the Order, 
objective of maintaining price stability 7.-(3) Except as provided herein
conducive to a balanced and sustainable above nothing in this section shall
growth of the national economy of be construed as to limit or affect
Tanzania. the obligation of the Bank to carry
5.-(4) Without prejudice to its primary out its primary objective,
objective as stated above, the Bank shall 
support the general economic policy of 
the Governments.
2006 7.-(1) The primary objective of the Bank 7.-(3) The Minister and the
shall be to formulate, define and Governor shall, where
implement monetary policy directed to circumstances require, consult
the economic objective of maintaining each other with a view to
domestic price stability conducive to a exchanging information and
balanced and sustainable growth of the seeking coordination on
national economy. economic and financial matters.
7.-(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1), There is no counterpart in the BoT 
the Bank shall ensure the integrity of the Act of 2006 to Section 7.-<2) of
financial system and support the general the BoT Act of 1995.
economic policy of the Government and 
promote sound monetary, credit and 
banking conditions conducive to the 
development of the national economy.
Sources: Government of Tanzania, BoT Acts of 1965,1995, and 2006, and 1978 Amendment to the BoT Act of 1965.
266
Monetary Policy in Tanzania
Notes
1. See Kaufmann and O'Connell (1997) on the quasi-fiscal implications of the exchange- 
control system in Tanzania, and Collier and Gunning (1991) on the quasi-fiscal 
implications of financial repression in Tanzania's socialist banking system.
2. See Mpango (2002) on Tanzania's experience with the cash budget. Cash budgets 
also played an important role in Uganda (Kasekende and Hussain, 2000) and 
Zambia (Adam and Bevan, 2000) during the 1990s.
3. The US Fed famously adopted a variant of reserve-money targeting (focused on what 
the Fed defined as non-borrowed reserves) at the outset of the Volcker disinflation 
in 1979.
4. The BoT has recently begun to take on many elements of IT, and we will focus on 
this ongoing transition in Section 11.3.
5. The former approach implies allowing elements of its balance sheet to adjust as 
may be required to keep the interest rate close to its target; the latter allows short­
term interest rates to adjust. The US Fed used a short-term interest rate target to 
pursue broad monetary aggregates during episodes in the 1970s and 1980s.
6. The financial programming model was designed to guide monetary and fiscal 
policy when balance-sheet data were available from the banking sector but a dearth 
of real-time information about the state of the economy limited the scope for fine- 
tuning the government's efforts to achieve economic stabilization (Polak, 1957).
7. This language is from the BoT Act of 2006 but is virtually identical with section 5.3 
of the BoT Act of 1995, which represented a major departure from the 1978 
Amendment to the BoT Act of 1965.
8. In contemporary monetary policy analysis, price stability is usually interpreted as a 
low and stable rate of expected inflation—a situation in which expectations are 
anchored in the sense that wage- and price-setters view shocks to inflation as tem­
porary. Inflation itself may be variable, but around a constant and low medium-term 
average.
9. The differences between headline and core inflation are striking in Figure 11.2b: 
there are only two years out of twenty in which core exceeds headline, suggesting 
that food and energy prices (taken together) have been rising in real terms over the 
entire twenty-year period.
10. The adjusted gap allows for a distinction between the programme ceiling and the 
implicit target of BoT behaviour and policy dialogue between the BoT and the 
IMF. In July 2007 reserve-money programme targets were redefined as applying to 
average reserve money in the final month of each quarter, rather than to reserve 
money on the final day; and rather than a single ceiling, a narrow target range was 
specified. The targets used in the regressions are the actual programme targets 
before July 2007, and the upper bound of the target range starting in July 2007. 
In Figure 11.5, these changes coincide with an apparent change both in the vola­
tility of the gap—which the move to a monthly average was intended to reduce— 
and the average level of the gap.
11. The logs of these two variables are non-stationary, but they share a common 
random walk component or stochastic trend. We cannot reject the hypothesis
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that the gap between the two variables is stationary, and we can only marginally 
reject the hypothesis that the cointegrating vector relating the two variables is [1 -1], 
Given the theoretical appeal of this restriction and the short data sample, we 
impose this restriction on the data and therefore estimate the error-correction 
equations using the gap as the lagged equilibrium error.
12. The statement that Granger causality mns in both directions means that each of 
these variables helps to predict the other, conditional on the other variable's lagged 
values.
13. There is weaker evidence of asymmetry on the reserve-money side, but columns 3 
and 7 suggest that adjustment was faster when reserves were below the ceiling than 
when they were above.
14. Portillo etal. (2016) note that food prices are considerably more flexible than 
non-food prices. They show that in a low-income economy with a large food- 
production sector that is subject to droughts and other supply shocks, the optimal 
inflation objective may be to stabilize non-food rather than headline inflation. The 
reason for this is that stabilizing headline inflation creates excessive volatility in 
inflation and output in the non-food sector.
15. Examples include the July 2007 adjustment in how reserve-money targets were 
calculated, the accommodation of quarterly real GDP data since 2010, and current 
discussions of improving policy responsiveness by elevating the informational role 
of free reserves (bank deposits at the BoT in excess of the statutory minimum) in 
the BoT's internal deliberations.
16. The classic analysis is Poole (1970), who focused on the markets for broad 
monetary aggregates and government securities. In a well-functioning financial 
market, the short-term rates determined in the interbank market feed through to 
the longer-term rates emphasized by Poole—an issue we address further in 
Section 11.3.3.
17. The BoT is of course alert to this concern, and pays attention to movements in 
exchange rates and market interest rates when deciding on monthly reserve- 
money targets. It also stands ready to alter liquidity conditions through direct 
interventions that include changes in reserve requirements or foreign exchange 
cover requirements.
18. The demand for liquidity by banks will depend on the BoT's operating procedures 
and on the presence or absence of standing facilities. There is therefore no pre­
sumption that the position of the demand curve in Figure 11.6 is independent of 
the policy framework.
19. Interbank interest rates are not shown in Figure 11.7 but are even more volatile 
than the repo rate (on short-maturity repurchase agreements by the BoT).
20. The financial-sector comparisons in this section are based on publicly available IMF 
data and use all countries in sub-Saharan Africa with available data, with the 
exception of countries in the CFA franc zone and non-South African members of 
the Rand Monetary Area. We exclude these countries because they are on fixed 
exchange rate systems.
21. The average monthly interest-rate spread in Tanzania (overall lending rate minus 
overall deposit rate) fell from 12.8 percentage points in 2000-04 to 6.9 in 2010-14,
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and is now below the median for eighteen comparator countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa (this group excludes the CFA zone and non-South African members of the 
Rand Monetary Area). The median spread among the comparator countries fell 
from 11.1 to 8.8 percentage points for the same periods.
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